Inside the Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Crisis Nobody Is Talking About

Inside the Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Crisis Nobody Is Talking About

Islamabad continues to withhold genuine legislative and fiscal authority from elected representatives in Gilgit-Baltistan—referred to in Indian official parlance as Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan (PoGB)—by governing the strategic mountain territory through executive orders rather than constitutional integration. While local voters cast ballots for a regional assembly, real power remains consolidated within the federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan and the non-elected bureaucratic apparatus in Islamabad. This structural bottleneck leaves the region's three million residents without representation in Pakistan’s parliament, without access to the Supreme Court, and without direct control over the massive revenues generated by their own land, water, and borders.

The arrangement is not an administrative accident. It is a deliberate geopolitical holding pattern that has persisted for over seven decades, trapping an entire population in a constitutional gray zone while external powers extract strategic and economic value from their soil.

The Architecture of Constitutional Limbo

To understand why elected lawmakers in Gilgit-Baltistan lack teeth, you have to look at the paperwork that defines their existence. Unlike Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan is not named as a federating unit in Article 1 of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution. Instead, it is ruled through a rotating series of presidential decrees—most notably the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 and the subsequent Gilgit-Baltistan Order of 2018.

An executive order is not a constitution. What Islamabad grants with one pen stroke, it can revise or revoke with another.

Under the 2018 Order, the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly sits in Gilgit, debates local issues, and passes resolutions. Yet its legislative competence is strictly hemmed in by a schedule of subjects that leaves major policy areas—defense, foreign affairs, currency, communications, and large-scale mineral and water exploitation—firmly in federal hands. Even on matters nominally within the assembly's purview, laws require the assent of the Governor, a political appointee selected directly by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

This creates a theater of democracy without the mechanics of accountability. Local ministers hold titles and draw salaries, but when a constituent asks why a highway remains unpaved or why federal taxes are collected without representation, those ministers can only point south toward Islamabad. The real decisions happen in bureaucratic committees far removed from the Karakorum mountains.

The Death of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council and the Rise of Centralization

For nearly a decade after 2009, power was split between the local assembly and the Gilgit-Baltistan Council, a body chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan that wielded executive authority over 55 critical subjects. Critics rightly called the Council a "super-legislature" that neutered local lawmakers.

When Islamabad introduced the 2018 Order, federal officials framed it as a historic devolution of power, stripping the Council of its legislative teeth and transferring those subjects to the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly. On paper, it looked like progress. In practice, the vacuum was immediately filled by the Prime Minister’s office itself, which retained sweeping powers to override regional legislation, issue directives to the Chief Minister, and control senior civil service appointments.

The bureaucratic spine of the region—the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police, and the heads of key administrative departments—are federal officers rotated in from Pakistan’s central services. They answer to the Establishment Division in Islamabad, not to the elected Chief Minister in Gilgit. If a local minister clashes with a federally appointed secretary over budget allocation or policy execution, the minister rarely wins.

Follow the Money and the Megawatts

Constitutional arguments can feel abstract until you look at a balance sheet. In Gilgit-Baltistan, the denial of real political power is directly tied to the extraction of natural resources.

Consider the region's geography. It sits at the confluence of the Himalayas, the Karakoram, and the Hindu Kush, holding the largest concentration of glaciers outside the polar regions. Those glaciers feed the Indus River system, which irrigates the agricultural heartland of Pakistan. Consequently, Gilgit-Baltistan holds staggering hydroelectric potential, estimated at over 40,000 megawatts.

Mega-projects like the Diamer-Bhasha Dam and the Bunji Dam are constructed on Gilgit-Baltistan’s territory, displacing local communities and submerging ancient heritage sites. Yet because the region is not a constitutional province, it is excluded from the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award—the constitutional formula that distributes federal tax revenues among Pakistan’s provinces—and it does not receive net hydel profit royalties in the manner guaranteed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Punjab under Article 161 of the Constitution.

Instead of receiving a constitutionally protected share of national wealth, Gilgit-Baltistan survives on an annual federal grant-in-aid. It is an allowance, not an entitlement.

The CPEC Bottleneck

The arrival of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) sharpened these grievances into open political friction. Gilgit-Baltistan is the sole overland gateway connecting China’s Xinjiang region to Pakistan via the Khunjerab Pass and the Karakoram Highway. Every fiber-optic cable, energy pipeline, and freight convoy moving between the two countries passes through this narrow mountain corridor.

Despite serving as the physical linchpin of a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure initiative, the Gilgit-Baltistan government was initially excluded from the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), the primary decision-making body for CPEC. Local leaders were not consulted when land was acquired for special economic zones, nor were they given a seat at the table when transit tariffs and environmental safeguards were negotiated.

When protests erupted in Skardu, Gilgit, and Hunza over land rights and lack of local employment, Islamabad responded with assurances and minor concessions rather than structural inclusion. The message to local politicians was unmistakable: CPEC is a strategic state project, and regional lawmakers are expected to facilitate it, not regulate it.

The Legal Black Hole

Beyond budgets and infrastructure lies a more fundamental deficit: the absence of basic constitutional rights. Because Pakistan’s Constitution does not formally extend to Gilgit-Baltistan, its residents cannot petition the Supreme Court of Pakistan or any High Court to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter 1 of the Constitution.

The region has its own judicial hierarchy, capped by the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan. However, that court operates under the framework of the executive order that created it, not under the constitutional protections that shield Pakistan’s superior judiciary. Judges are appointed through processes heavily influenced by the federal executive, and their jurisdiction stops at the borders of the territory.

For an ordinary citizen, this means legal vulnerability. If a resident is detained under federal security laws, or if a local merchant’s property is seized for a state project, there is no constitutional avenue to challenge the federal government in Islamabad’s highest courts.

The Weaponization of Schedule IV

This legal gray zone has real consequences for political dissent. Over the past decade, dozens of local activists, journalists, and nationalist politicians—particularly those affiliated with groups like the Awami Action Committee and the Balawaristan National Front—have been placed on Schedule IV of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act.

Schedule IV was designed to monitor suspected militants. In Gilgit-Baltistan, critics argue it has been routinely deployed against peaceful protesters demanding wheat subsidies, land ownership rights, or constitutional reform. Being placed on the list restricts an individual’s movement, freezes bank accounts, requires regular reporting to local police stations, and effectively ends their ability to participate in public life.

Because the region lacks full constitutional judicial review, challenging an arbitrary placement on Schedule IV is an uphill battle fought in local courts that lack the authority to strike down federal security directives.

Why Islamabad Refuses to Let Go

If denying real power to Gilgit-Baltistan breeds chronic unrest, why hasn't Islamabad simply granted the region full provincial status?

The official explanation rests on the Kashmir dispute. Gilgit-Baltistan was historically part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir prior to 1947. Pakistan’s longstanding foreign policy position, anchored in United Nations Security Council resolutions from 1948 and 1949, holds that the final status of the entire former princely state must be determined through a UN-supervised plebiscite.

Islamabad’s foreign ministry has argued for decades that formally annexing Gilgit-Baltistan as Pakistan’s fifth province would undermine its legal standing on Kashmir at the United Nations. Doing so, diplomats warn, would validate India’s unilateral changes to the status of Jammu and Kashmir—specifically New Delhi’s 2019 revocation of Article 370—and weaken Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite.

"You cannot ask the world to respect the disputed status of Kashmir while unilaterally altering the constitutional map of one of its largest territories," a former Pakistani foreign secretary noted during a policy seminar in Islamabad, capturing the diplomatic bind that has paralyzed reform for generations.

Yet many analysts inside and outside the region view the UN argument as a convenient shield for other motives.

First, integrating Gilgit-Baltistan as a full province would require amending Pakistan’s Constitution, which alters the delicate demographic and electoral balance inside the National Assembly and the Senate. Established political parties in Punjab and Sindh are often hesitant to recalibrate seat allocations and NFC revenue shares for a sparsely populated mountain territory.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, maintaining Gilgit-Baltistan as an executive-ruled territory gives Pakistan’s military and security establishment friction-free control over a vital strategic buffer zone bordering China, Afghanistan, and Indian-administered Ladakh. Full provincial autonomy would bring parliamentary oversight, provincial police autonomy, and constitutional court scrutiny to an area where the security apparatus currently operates with minimal civilian interference.

The Winter Protests That Exposed the Fault Lines

The fragility of this arrangement became impossible to ignore during the winter of 2023–2024, when tens of thousands of residents marched in sub-zero temperatures across Skardu and Gilgit.

The immediate trigger was economic. Islamabad had quietly slashed the decades-old wheat subsidy—a vital lifeline in a high-altitude region where harsh winters limit local agriculture and transport costs drive up food prices. At the same time, federal authorities introduced new taxes and struggled to resolve crippling 20-hour daily power outages, even as the region's rivers generated electricity for the rest of the country.

What made the protests remarkable was the irrelevance of the elected Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly.

The protesters did not march to the Chief Minister’s secretariat expecting him to solve the crisis. They knew he lacked the money and the authority to restore the subsidy or halt federal taxation. Instead, the movement was led by the Awami Action Committee, a grassroots coalition of traders, lawyers, student unions, and religious leaders.

The elected cabinet was reduced to acting as a nervous intermediary, flying back and forth to Islamabad to beg federal bureaucrats for emergency funds to quiet the streets. Eventually, Islamabad relented, restoring the wheat subsidy and forming yet another committee to review constitutional demands. The streets calmed, but the underlying lesson lingered: in Gilgit-Baltistan, street agitation yields faster results than casting a ballot.

The Hypothetical Trap of Half-Measures

To see how this governance model breaks down in practice, consider a hypothetical example of a mid-sized hydroelectric project proposed in a district like Ghizer.

Suppose the elected Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly passes a resolution stipulating that 30 percent of the project’s net revenue must stay in the local district for schools and clinics, and that local contractors must receive priority bidding. Because water resources and major energy projects fall under federal regulatory bodies like WAPDA and the Ministry of Water Resources, the resolution has no binding legal force.

When a federal agency signs a contract with a foreign engineering firm in Islamabad without incorporating the assembly’s conditions, local lawmakers cannot sue the federal government in the Supreme Court for violating provincial autonomy, because no such constitutional autonomy exists. The Chief Minister can issue a press release expressing concern, while the federally appointed Chief Secretary executes the land acquisition orders handed down from Islamabad. The voters who elected the local assembly see their representatives ignored, deepening cynicism toward the entire electoral process.

The Cost of Permanent Transition

For over seventy-five years, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have been told their status is temporary, awaiting a diplomatic breakthrough over Kashmir that shows no sign of materializing. Generations have been born, lived, and died in a state of constitutional suspension.

By offering the trappings of self-rule—elections, flags, assembly halls, and ministerial protocol—while withholding actual fiscal and legislative sovereignty, Islamabad has created a system that satisfies no one. International observers point to the democratic deficit, Indian officials cite the lack of local empowerment to highlight Pakistan’s control over PoGB, and local residents grow increasingly alienated from a state they voluntarily acceded to in 1947.

An assembly that cannot tax, cannot legislate on its own natural resources, cannot protect its citizens through a constitutional court, and cannot command its own civil service is not a legislature. It is an advisory council with an election budget, and until Islamabad decides whether Gilgit-Baltistan is a citizen-bearing province or a managed territory, every election held in those mountains will end at the same locked door.

SM

Sophia Morris

With a passion for uncovering the truth, Sophia Morris has spent years reporting on complex issues across business, technology, and global affairs.