Most international commentary treats Benjamin Netanyahu as the sole obstacle to Middle East peace, which is a dangerous misreading of Israeli politics.
If Netanyahu loses power, Palestinians shouldn't expect a sudden shift toward statehood or a dramatic dismantling of the occupation. The immediate changes would be stylistic, diplomatic, and tactical rather than foundational. A post-Netanyahu coalition might restore humanitarian coordination, unfreeze withheld tax revenues, and stop the most inflammatory rhetoric coming from far-right ministers like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Yet the core architecture of military control in the West Bank, the blockade dynamics around Gaza, and the broad Israeli consensus against a sovereign Palestinian state in the near term would remain largely intact. For a different perspective, read: this related article.
Understanding what actually changes for Palestinians if Netanyahu loses requires looking past Western wishful thinking and examining the real political map inside Israel today.
Why Replacing Netanyahu Doesn't Mean Replacing the Policy
When you watch coverage from Washington or London, it's easy to fall into the trap of personalizing the conflict. Netanyahu has been Israel's dominant political figure for decades, so naturally, critics blame him for everything from settlement expansion to the collapse of the Oslo framework. Similar reporting on the subject has been shared by The Guardian.
That's only half the story.
Netanyahu didn't create the rightward shift in Israeli society; he rode it and weaponized it. Following the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000, the Second Intifada, and especially the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, the Israeli political center moved sharply to the right on security. Today, the main opposition figures capable of replacing Netanyahu—politicians like Benny Gantz, Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, or Avigdor Lieberman—are not ideological doves.
Let's look at the numbers. In July 2024, the Knesset passed a resolution overwhelmingly rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. It passed 68 to 9. Benny Gantz's National Unity party voted in favor of it, and Yair Lapid's Yesh Atid party didn't even oppose it, choosing to walk out rather than vote against the motion.
Think about what that means on the ground. Even if Netanyahu exits the Prime Minister's Office tomorrow, the parliamentary majority required to govern Israel will still oppose Palestinian sovereignty. For a farmer in the Jordan Valley or a shopkeeper in Ramallah, the ideological label of the coalition in Jerusalem matters far less than the reality of checkpoints, permit regimes, and military raids. Those mechanisms of control enjoy broad institutional support across Israel's security establishment and political center.
Where Palestinians Would Feel an Immediate Difference
Saying the core strategy won't change doesn't mean nothing changes. In fact, for millions of Palestinians living under Israeli control, the difference between Netanyahu's far-right coalition and a centrist-led government could mean the difference between economic collapse and basic survival.
The Release of Withheld Tax Revenues
Under the Paris Protocol of 1994, Israel collects customs duties and value-added taxes on goods entering the Palestinian territories on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA). These clearance revenues make up roughly two-thirds of the PA's total budget.
Under Netanyahu's finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, Israel repeatedly froze or deducted massive portions of these funds, pushing the PA to the brink of insolvency. Public sector workers in the West Bank—teachers, nurses, police officers—went months receiving only partial salaries. A centrist government led by figures like Lapid or Gantz would almost certainly restore normal transfers of these funds. They view a functioning PA not as a favor to Palestinians, but as an essential security buffer for Israel.
Curbing State-Backed Settler Violence
During Netanyahu's tenure alongside far-right partners, settler violence in the West Bank spiked to record levels documented by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Far-right ministers actively discouraged police enforcement against extremist settlers and handed out thousands of assault rifles to civilian security squads in settlements.
A post-Netanyahu government would likely reassert traditional Israeli military and police discipline in the West Bank. Security chiefs in the Shin Bet and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have repeatedly warned that unchecked settler violence inflames the West Bank and drains military resources. Removing ideological extremists from the Ministry of National Security and the Civil Administration would restore stricter rules of engagement and crack down on vigilante attacks against Palestinian villages.
Toning Down the Rhetoric and Rebuilding Diplomatic Channels
Words matter when they come from cabinet ministers. Under Netanyahu's far-right coalition, senior officials openly discussed annexing the West Bank, dismantling the PA, and encouraging the "voluntary migration" of Palestinians from Gaza.
Replacing this cabinet would instantly lower the temperature. Centrist leaders understand that Israel's survival depends on maintaining strategic alliances with the United States, European nations, and regional partners like Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. They would reopen regular diplomatic channels with Ramallah, coordinate more closely with international aid agencies like UNRWA or its successors, and halt the most provocative announcements regarding deep-West Bank settlement construction.
Gaza and the Day After Debate
The sharpest policy divergence between Netanyahu and his domestic rivals centers on Gaza. Throughout the war that began in October 2023, Netanyahu repeatedly blocked serious planning for post-war governance in Gaza, refusing to allow any role for a reformed Palestinian Authority while rejecting clear exit strategies. Critics inside his own war cabinet, including Gantz and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, accused him of prioritizing his political survival over a coherent strategic endgame.
If Netanyahu loses, Israel's approach to Gaza would shift from indefinite open-ended ambiguity to a structured regional framework.
Here's what a centrist Israeli government would likely pursue in Gaza:
- A Regional Stabilization Force — Centrist leaders have expressed far greater openness to working with the United States, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia to create an international or Arab-backed administrative mechanism for Gaza.
- A Limited Role for Local Technocrats — While no mainstream Israeli politician will accept Hamas remaining in power, an alternative government would likely accept a revitalized, technocratic Palestinian administration linked to the PA to manage civil affairs, policing, and reconstruction.
- Predictable Humanitarian Corridors — Rather than using aid delivery as a political bargaining chip to appease right-wing coalition partners, a centrist government would streamline inspection mechanisms and allow sustained reconstruction materials into the strip under international monitoring.
Still, don't confuse a better humanitarian arrangement with freedom. Even under a centrist government, the IDF would insist on maintaining a perimeter buffer zone inside Gaza, controlling borders and airspace, and retaining the right to conduct military raids whenever intelligence suggests militant regrouping.
The West Bank Settlement Reality Nobody Wants to Confront
Anyone claiming a post-Netanyahu government will reverse settlement growth isn't looking at the facts on the ground. Over 700,000 Israeli settlers now live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. That demographic reality wasn't built by Netanyahu alone; every Israeli government since 1967, including those led by the Labor party, expanded settlements.
What changes without Netanyahu is the geography of expansion.
Netanyahu's coalition aggressively approved remote outposts deep inside the West Bank—areas that deliberately carve up Palestinian territorial continuity and make any future contiguous state impossible. A centrist government, following the traditional Israeli "consensus" model, would likely freeze isolated outposts and halt state funding for illegal hilltop encampments.
However, they would continue building inside the major settlement blocs near the 1967 Green Line, such as Ma'ale Adumim, Ariel, and Gush Etzion, as well as neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. For Palestinians living in neighborhoods like Sheikh Jarrah or Silwan, or villages surrounded by expanding blocs, the slow squeeze on land and housing permits wouldn't disappear. It would simply happen quieter, with fewer press conferences and less international outrage.
Why Israeli Politics Keeps Moving Right Regardless of Who Wins
To really grasp what happens after Netanyahu, you have to understand the structural forces driving Israeli voters. It's not about one man's charisma or legal troubles.
First, demographics favor the right. Religious Zionist and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) families have significantly higher birth rates than secular, liberal Israelis. Year after year, the electorate tilts more traditional, nationalist, and skeptical of territorial compromises.
Second, trauma shapes voting behavior. The collapse of the 1990s peace process, the rocket fire that followed Israel's 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and the visceral shock of October 7 convinced a massive majority of Jewish Israelis that ceding land brings terror rather than peace. You don't erase that kind of collective trauma with a single election.
Third, the Palestinian leadership faces its own profound legitimacy crisis. Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are deeply unpopular among Palestinians, widely viewed as corrupt, authoritarian, and ineffective. Meanwhile, Hamas remains committed to armed struggle. Many centrist Israelis ask a simple question: Even if we wanted to make a historic compromise tomorrow, who on the Palestinian side has the authority and public backing to sign it and enforce it?
Until both societies undergo internal transformations, any Israeli prime minister—whether it's Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz, or Naftali Bennett—will operate within narrow political boundaries. They can manage the conflict more humanely, cooperate with Washington, and improve daily living conditions for Palestinians, yet none of them possesses the mandate to end the occupation.
How to Read the Next Israeli Election Without Getting Fooled
When the next Israeli election campaign heats up and Western headlines start predicting a "new dawn" if Netanyahu falls, look past the speeches and track four concrete indicators instead. These metrics tell you whether real policy is shifting or if it's just cosmetic rebranding.
- Who Controls the Finance Ministry and Civil Administration — Watch whether the new government dismantles the separate administrative structure Smotrich created inside the Defense Ministry to govern West Bank civilians. Returning full authority to the IDF's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) signals a return to pragmatic security management over ideological annexation.
- The Status of Area C Construction Permits — Area C makes up over 60% of the West Bank and remains under full Israeli civil and military control. Under Netanyahu, Palestinian building permits in Area C were virtually nonexistent while demolitions surged. If a new government approves master plans for Palestinian villages in Area C, that's a genuine policy shift.
- Prisoner Releases and Administrative Detention Numbers — Track the data from human rights groups like B'Tselem and HaMoked on Palestinians held without charge or trial. A drop in administrative detentions indicates a de-escalation strategy; steady or rising numbers mean the security apparatus is operating business as usual.
- Direct Talks with Ramallah — Look for formal, public meetings between the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian President or Prime Minister—not secret backchannel security coordination, which never truly stopped.
If Netanyahu loses power, Palestinians will likely get breathing room. The economic strangulation of the West Bank will ease, unchecked settler violence will face real pushback from Israeli security forces, and Gaza's reconstruction will finally move past political gridlock. Those improvements matter immensely to ordinary people trying to feed their families and live without daily terror.
Just don't mistake better conflict management for liberation. Ending the occupation requires dismantling systems that Israel's entire political mainstream still fights to preserve.